Ursnif — 2 August 2021 campaign
In recent days, a new malspam campaign containing the Ursnif malware has been detected targeting Italy.
The Zip file contains a JS file that acts as a Dropper and connects to the following addresses:
- https://docs.zohopublic[.]eu/downloaddocument.do?docId=674nid9fbf67b530c494389056fbaf4129f4b&docExtn=zip
- http://josymixmyhome[.]com.br/site/direct.php
- https://docs.zohopublic[.]eu/downloaddocument.do?docId=674ni1c6312a91d7149af89b6475ece38b9b3&docExtn=png
To download a new Ursnif sample. This sample is then extracted and saved as direction.dll.

From the analysis performed on direction.dll, the sample employs a Defense Evasion mechanism. Specifically, it performs environment-type checks to detect execution within a sandbox and modifies its behavior accordingly, thereby complicating analysis. Additionally, the malware accepts input parameters, so its behavior varies based on arguments passed through the sample execution command.
| ATT&CK Tactic | ATT&CK Technique |
| DEFENSE EVASION | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion::System Checks T1497.001 |
| EXECUTION | Command and Scripting Interpreter::T1059 |
During execution, the sample contacts Command and Control servers at the following domains:
- alliances[.]bar
- allianceline[.]bar
- alliancer[.]bar

Static Analysis
JS File
Tag
Dropper
Details
| md5 | A8E17B6252ED7E3C9BDA4F55B2E3CAC9 |
| sha1 | E70B1DC096FDCE51C240D02BE32DEA3C6D3CE2E6 |
| sha256 | C36C266157D4E7B7B2DBC36D96BDE0086E31647B541B14DB70D9FE1E36BAE779 |
| file-size | 53 939 (bytes) |
| entropy | 4.434 |
| Virustotal | score: 26/64 |
direction.dll
Tag
Ursnif
Details
| md5 | 499200F6A8E223C057C6E16701740721 |
| sha1 | EF46F9C62B94715B750173074C51100285FF6FE9 |
| sha256 | D7E64F8E65CE586CE2F0A857810B2A23F85140BF5E52E5A824F09787FB2BF45E |
| file-size | 258 504 (bytes) |
| entropy | 6.406 |
| imphash | D34313CE3555DEC95480BCAE2D5DEA6B |
| cpu | 32-bit |
| Virustotal | score: 46/64 |
IOC
- Dropper
- MD5: A8E17B6252ED7E3C9BDA4F55B2E3CAC9
- SHA1: E70B1DC096FDCE51C240D02BE32DEA3C6D3CE2E6
- SHA256: C36C266157D4E7B7B2DBC36D96BDE0086E31647B541B14DB70D9FE1E36BAE779
- Ursnif
- MD5: 499200F6A8E223C057C6E16701740721
- SHA1: EF46F9C62B94715B750173074C51100285FF6FE9
- SHA256: D7E64F8E65CE586CE2F0A857810B2A23F85140BF5E52E5A824F09787FB2BF45E
- Domains for Ursnif sample download:
- https://docs.zohopublic[.]eu/downloaddocument.do?docId=674nid9fbf67b530c494389056fbaf4129f4b&docExtn=zip
- http://josymixmyhome[.]com.br/site/direct.php
- https://docs.zohopublic[.]eu/downloaddocument.do?docId=674ni1c6312a91d7149af89b6475ece38b9b3&docExtn=png
- C2 server domains:
- alliances[.]bar
- allianceline[.]bar
- alliancer[.]bar
The observed malspam campaign demonstrates the continued reliance on multi-stage delivery chains combining T1566.001 (Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment) with T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter) and T1497.001 (Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks). The adoption of parameterized execution and environment detection reflects operator sophistication in evading Cyber Threat Intelligence collection and automated analysis platforms. Organizations should maintain vigilance against malspam vectors and implement behavioral detection mechanisms to identify sandbox-evasion patterns during execution.