After recent online publications regarding the TrueBot malware (VMware, Bleeping and THN), we have decided to contributing with our analysis of this potential new threat. At the end, you will find the indicators of compromise and a Yara rule to identify it. Before starting with the technical analysis of the malware, we believe it is useful to highlight some of its features:
    • It is a downloader type malware, used in the early stages of compromise.
    • It has used the Raspberry Robin worm as an attack vector.
    • It has been associated with at least two different Ransomware (Cl0p and EvilCorp).
    • It is the evolution of the Silent.Dropper malware.
    • It is a tool used by the criminal actor known as Silence.
The following is the general scheme of compromise:

For more information on how to defend yourself:

Technical analysis

Stage 1 – JavaScript

Our analysis begins with the identification of a JavaScript file, presumably inserted as an attachment to a malicious email. From intelligence activities, it was possible to recover the file named information_7_apr-4753978.js. The content of the script is obfuscated, in order to make analysis activities more complex:
After a deep cleaning of the code, the only noteworthy command emerges as:
The content, encoded in Base64, is represented here in its de-obfuscated form:
It is a PowerShell command that executes the file “dll.png“, fetched from the address 62[.]204[.]41[.]69. The format of the file does not appear to be an image type (PNG) or attributable to a dll. In reality, it is a PowerShell script encoded inside a text file:

Stage2 – DLL

The script, once executed, starts the download of a dynamic library (ldn.dll) from the address 62[.]204[.]41[.]69 and saves it in the path $env:APPDATA\ with name NoSleep.dll.
This is then loaded into memory via the command
cmd /c rundll32 %APPDATA%\NoSleep.dll,ChkdskExs

Stage3 – C&C

The library NoSleep.dll, signed with a Sectigo certificate, is none other than the TrueBot malware:
Thanks to reverse engineering and dynamic analysis, it was possible to reconstruct its entire behavior. The first identified activities are related to assigning a unique identifier to the infected machine. This is achieved by creating the file C:\ProgramData\<GUI>.JSONIP and a mutex with the name (u3qkfewi3ujrk32lqpti32ofwq)
Subsequently, the malware proceeds to create two scheduled tasks to ensure persistence in the system:
    • MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore{1575CC8A-457A-1700-652A-6AF2B031A266}
    • MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore{1575CC8A-457A-1700-652A-6AF2B031A266}
Both tasks are assigned to execute the same command every ten minutes:
cmd /c C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe /S <PathDll>\NoSleep.dll,ChkdskExs
At this point, a list of executables associated with active processes is created, excluding system services. Finally, this list is sent in URLEncode + Base64 format to the Command and Control server via a POST to the URL hxxp://droogggdhfhf[.]com/gate.php.
POST /gate.php HTTP/1.0
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 778

At each iteration of the task, general information relating to the infected system is forwarded to the server, also signaling the availability to receive further instructions to process.
POST /gate.php HTTP/1.0
Content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-length: 180


Capability Analysis

The main purpose of the malware is to send information about active processes in the system to the C2 server and execute the commands returned by the server. When compared to other malware of the same type, the set of operations that TrueBot can perform is extremely limited:
Command Effect
KLLS Delete DLL and end process.
404NO Empty command.
http Not identified. Parses values separated by “|” o “/”.
PS1 Download a PowerShell script with path C:\ProgramData\<GUID>.ps1 and executes it via the command wmic.exe process call create \”powershell -executionpolicy bypass -nop -w hidden <file ps1>\”.
SHC Download and execute a shellcode, injecting it into a new process cmd.exe.
S64 Download and execute a shellcode, injecting it into a new process cmd.exe.
TrueBot is a downloader malware, and as such it is mainly used by an operator to convey other malicious software (e.g. CobaltStrike). It is clear that it was designed to complete generic tasks. In fact, there are no advanced commands usually used by an attacker to carry out advanced compromise activities.


Our malware analysis team has developed the following Yara rule:

rule TrueBotRule {


       Author = Fortgale

       Summary = TrueBot Yara Rule


       $possible_function_name = ChkdskExs wide ascii

       $parameters_mapping = n=%s&o=%s&a=%d&u=%s&p=%s&d=%s wide ascii

       $ps1_path = %s\\%08x-%08x.ps1 wide ascii

       $jsonip_regex = *.JSONIP wide ascii

       $jsonip_path = %s\\%s.JSONIP wide ascii

       $uri = /gate.php wide ascii


       $schedtask_name1 = /MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore\{[A-Fa-f0-9\-]+\}/


       uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and any of them


Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

The following indicators of compromise were extracted from the analysis carried out: Domains
    • droogggdhfhf[.]com
    • 62[.]204[.]41[.]69
    • 92[.]118[.]36[.]236
    • hxxp://62[.]204[.]41[.]69/dll.png
    • hxxp://62[.]204[.]41[.]69/ldn.dll
    • hxxp://droogggdhfhf[.]com/gate.php
    • (u3qkfewi3ujrk32lqpti32ofwq
    • information_7_apr-4753978.js: 8A2AA35F1E8E8186A0F4A6684D3CAB54E093914B2DBA38F59D5D01C6EE6AAF04
    • NoSleep.dll: b803db527f146f0d356700e24836a2e888f74c3dd2196a99f73caa0e57007f34
Hashes identified using the Yara rule
    • 594ade1fb42e93e64afc96f13824b3dbd942a2cdbc877a7006c248a38425bbc1
    • 47f962063b42de277cd8d22550ae47b1787a39aa6f537c5408a59b5b76ed0464
    • ff8c8c8bfba5f2ba2f8003255949678df209dbff95e16f2f3c338cfa0fd1b885
    • c042ad2947caf4449295a51f9d640d722b5a6ec6957523ebf68cddb87ef3545c
    • 0e3a14638456f4451fe8d76fdc04e591fba942c2f16da31857ca66293a58a4c3
    • 1285aa7e6ee729be808c46c069e30a9ee9ce34287151076ba81a0bea0508ff7e
    • 2c8d58f439c708c28ac4ad4a0e9f93046cf076fc6e5ab1088e8943c0909acbc4
    • 97bae3587f1d2fd35f24eb214b9dd6eed95744bed62468d998c7ef55ff8726d4
    • 80b9c5ec798e7bbd71bbdfffab11653f36a7a30e51de3a72c5213eafe65965d9
    • 22e3f4602a258e92a0b8deb5a2bd69c67f4ac3ca67362a745178848a9da7a3cc
    • ed38c454575879c2546e5fccace0b16a701c403dfe3c3833730d23b32e41f2fe
    • 7c607eca4005ba6415e09135ef38033bb0b0e0ff3e46d60253fc420af7519347
    • b95a764820e918f42b664f3c9a96141e2d7d7d228da0edf151617fabdd9166cf
    • 97d0844ce9928e32b11706e06bf2c4426204d998cb39964dd3c3de6c5223fff0
    • 8d8a0e751c5bcc4169e0e7bc6593764c67b3c97d6511563525bed7bac3786b15
    • 68a86858b4638b43d63e8e2aaec15a9ebd8fc14d460dd74463db42e59c4c6f89
    • 2d50b03a92445ba53ae147d0b97c494858c86a56fe037c44bc0edabb902420f7
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    • bf3c7f0ba324c96c9a9bff6cf21650a4b78edbc0076c68a9a125ebcba0e523c9
    • a69400c59c9d523d9c0548e2c1cb27ebcc4fa04b512d6fb7b9917b8ab3e00844
    • 172e9ae8c25df7eae916bafccc8d11615317c3144a77a0d106f672dd7d62c1f5
    • 40e1e6bbfd567fe6a1eb826667966cade58522718c96ddea5c6c4804de26c800
    • c713b48fc5335c1659c6e38e2b5ed304a4425ccde4c8c7706dbcce40cb8f02e2
    • 6210a9f5a5e1dc27e68ecd61c092d2667609e318a95b5dade3c28f5634a89727
    • 3160c6e4384affbd13179a5299fa2e1c39a5c777c696eba41d360b8377db0e10
    • fea48868a14f4b275a5e6a4a26b69e874b5ac7bdf4c65bcb1299db3f0cb44d46
    • c3b3640ddf53b26f4ebd4eedf929540edb452c413ca54d0d21cc405c7263f490
    • 72813522a065e106ac10aa96e835c47aa9f34e981db20fa46a8f36c4543bb85d
    • 1ef8cdbd3773bd82e5be25d4ba61e5e59371c6331726842107c0f1eb7d4d1f49
    • 092910024190a2521f21658be849c4ac9ae6fa4d5f2ecd44c9055cc353a26875
    • 7e39dcd15307e7de862b9b42bf556f2836bf7916faab0604a052c82c19e306ca
    • 7a64bc69b60e3cd3fd00d4424b411394465640f499e56563447fe70579ccdd00
    • c3743a8c944f5c9b17528418bf49b153b978946838f56e5fca0a3f6914bee887
    • 7c79ec3f5c1a280ffdf19d0000b4bfe458a3b9380c152c1e130a89de3fe04b63

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